First published 2026 November 11
You have tried. You kept your appointments, took the medications, did what you were asked. You may have been in treatment for years — sometimes with the same clinician, sometimes moving from one to the next. And you are not getting better.
At some point, quietly or not so quietly, the question turns inward. If the treatment isn’t working, and you have been a compliant patient, the most available explanation is you. Something in you resists. Something in you needs to stay sick. You are, perhaps, one of the difficult ones.
That feeling — that you are the problem — may have arrived before anyone said it out loud. But eventually, in many cases, someone does say it, or writes it, or implies it in the way they talk about your prognosis. The word that appears is treatment-resistant. Or difficult. Or, in the older language of psychoanalysis, the negative therapeutic reaction — the patient who gets worse despite good treatment, or who simply does not improve whatever is done.
I want to suggest that this explanation, however it arrives, may be pointing in the wrong direction.
I have spent more than forty years on both sides of this question — as a clinician and as a patient — and I want to say something directly to anyone who carries one of these labels: the label may tell you more about what hasn’t been tried than about who you are.
The label and what it does
“Treatment-resistant depression” is defined, in most protocols, as depression that has not responded to two or more adequate trials of medication. The term has practical uses. It identifies patients who may need a different approach — a different medication, a combination, ECT, or something not yet tried. For that purpose, it is useful.
But notice what the term does beyond that function. It travels ahead of you, in the chart and in the referral letter. It tells the next clinician what to expect before you have met. It can lower what is attempted — why try something ambitious for a patient who is known not to respond? And over time, the person who carries the label may come to believe it. I am treatment-resistant. I am the problem. I am the one for whom nothing works.
The label is not unique to depression. We speak of treatment-resistant schizophrenia, treatment-resistant personality disorders, and — more informally — the difficult patient, the frequent flyer, the heartsink patient (a term from British general practice, named for what the clinician feels when this patient’s name appears on the schedule). Each of these describes a relationship in which a clinician feels defeated, and each files that relationship under the name of one of its two members.
A hundred years of the same move
This is not new within psychiatry and psychotherapy, but it is far older than either. The pattern is this: when institutions cannot help people, the most convenient explanation is that those people cannot be helped. It protects the institution from examining its tools, its methods, its limitations. The explanation points at the person who didn’t get better, and the institution moves on.
Medicine has repeated this pattern across its specialties and across centuries. It is not a peculiarity of psychiatry, or of psychotherapy, or of any single tradition. It is what institutions do when they cannot explain their failures: they locate the failure in the person who did not get better.
Consider what happened to patients with unexplained symptoms that did not fit the diagnostic categories of their time. They were called hysterics, malingerers, attention-seekers — women especially, told that their suffering was performance or character flaw. The patients hadn’t changed; what changed, eventually, was our understanding. The label “hysteria” said nothing true about those patients. It said something about the limits of the medicine that couldn’t help them.
Neurology offers a sharp version of this history. Before modern imaging, many patients with multiple sclerosis, non-epileptic seizures, and other neurological conditions were told their symptoms had no organic basis — that they were psychosomatic, histrionic, or feigned. The discovery that these conditions were real changed nothing about those patients; it changed what medicine was capable of seeing. Functional neurological disorder remains contested in some quarters today, not because the symptoms are doubted, but because medicine has not yet found the mechanism. Patients living in that gap — real symptoms, no confirmed lesion — are still vulnerable to the same verdict: it must be you.
Rheumatology, immunology, and infectious disease have each had their version. Lupus was for decades dismissed in some of its presentations as the complaint of an anxious woman. Chronic fatigue syndrome and its successors were labeled psychiatric, their patients accused of secondary gain or unconscious amplification. Patients with Lyme disease and its long-term sequelae still find themselves in a contested territory between what they experience and what the available tests can confirm. In each case the pattern is the same: an illness that medicine cannot yet explain or treat becomes, by default, something wrong with the patient who has it.
Gastroenterology has its irritable bowel syndrome, long treated as a psychosomatic condition and now understood to involve real changes in the gut-brain axis. Cardiology has its patients with chest pain and clean arteries — still sometimes labeled anxious or drug-seeking, though the condition is real. Dermatology, neurology, oncology: every specialty has its cohort of patients who were told, in some period of its history, that their condition was not quite real, or that their failure to improve reflected something about them.
Chronic pain has a similar history. For decades, patients whose pain did not respond to standard treatment were labeled drug-seeking, catastrophizing, or simply difficult. Many still are. The pain is real; the treatment has not found its way to it; and the person in pain is handed the explanation.
Addiction is perhaps the starkest case. The oldest response to it is the moral model: the person drinks, or uses, because they lack willpower, because they don’t truly want to get better, because something in their character is defective. Treatment after treatment has been built on this premise, and when treatment fails, the premise is confirmed rather than questioned. The field has spent a century arguing against this model, and it persists anyway, because it is so useful to those who cannot help.
At its most extreme, the pattern resembles what happened to people with leprosy for most of human history. Leprosy was for centuries less a diagnosis than a social position: the person was set apart, and the condition itself explained why others kept their distance. A patient who carries the label “treatment-resistant” is not exiled in that way. But something of the same logic can operate. The label travels ahead of them, explaining in advance why help may fail, and the explanation points away from the help.
The same move, in the language of the mind
Psychoanalysis has used the term negative therapeutic reaction since 1923, when Freud described patients who get worse after progress, or who come for years without improving. His explanation: the need for illness had won out over the wish for recovery. Unconscious guilt, masochism, envy, the death drive — over the following decades, the explanations multiplied and varied. What they shared was a single assumption: the cause of the failure lies in the patient.
The relational schools in psychotherapy have changed much of this. The clinician’s own contribution, enactment, the question of whose needs the treatment is serving — these are ordinary subjects of clinical discussion now. But the habit has outlived the theories that produced it. And in psychiatry and general medicine it operates without any theory of the unconscious at all. A treatment that has not worked becomes an attribute of the person who received it. The word “resistant” does the work: the medication worked; the patient resisted it.
Consider the inversion: it is not the patient who is treatment-resistant but the clinician who has not found the right treatment. The more accurate phrase, perhaps, would be “learning-resistant psychiatrists.”
That is a provocation. It is also a theory of where causes lie.
The question the label forecloses
The research literature has been asking the right question for some time, though its answers have not always reached clinical practice. Studies of psychotherapy outcomes consistently find that results vary not only with patients but with clinicians — some consistently help more of the people they treat than others do with comparable patients. The therapeutic alliance, which belongs to both people in the room, is among the most reliable predictors of outcome across approaches. And an international psychiatric consensus, published in 2020, proposed replacing “treatment-resistant depression” with “difficult-to-treat depression” — a “broader, perhaps more empathic concept” — and urged clinicians to reassess patient-related, illness-related, and treatment-related barriers before concluding the difficulty is the patient’s.
None of this means the patient’s contribution is irrelevant, or that every failed treatment is the clinician’s fault. Some treatments fail for reasons no one could have prevented. The claim is narrower: the question cannot be settled by examining the patient alone.
What this means if you carry the label
If you have been told you are treatment-resistant, or difficult, or that your personality makes treatment unlikely to succeed, I want to offer a different way of thinking about it.
A label that converts a treatment’s failure into your pathology may protect the treatment from examination. It may tell the next clinician what to expect in a way that closes down what is attempted. And it may, for someone whose history already inclines them to feel responsible for what goes wrong between themselves and others, become one more way of carrying what belongs, in part, to someone else.
This is not a reason to distrust all treatment, or to assume that any clinician who uses these terms is acting in bad faith. Most are trying to help, and the labels have uses that shouldn’t be dismissed. But if treatment has not helped you, the most useful question is not “what in me resists getting better?” It is: What has not yet been tried? Who else might I see? What is the evidence that this approach, with this clinician, is the right one for me?
A treatment that has not worked is information about the treatment.
It is not a verdict on you.