“The System Failed Lindsay Clancy.” What System?

First Published 2026 October 28

In January 2023, Lindsay Clancy strangled her three children in their Duxbury, Massachusetts home, then jumped from a second-floor window in an apparent suicide attempt. She survived. Her children did not.

She had been prescribed eleven medications in the four months before the killings — five antidepressants, three benzodiazepines, a sleep aid — by six different providers. Each medication change followed a report of worsening symptoms: racing thoughts, dissociation, suicidal ideation, auditory hallencinations. Each time, the response was a new prescription or a dose adjustment. She had no ongoing psychotherapist.

This month, her husband Patrick filed a civil lawsuit against her psychiatric providers. The suit will likely turn on questions of polypharmacy and standard of care — whether any individual prescriber deviated from accepted practice. That is the wrong question. The right question is whether the standard of care itself is the problem.

When people say the system failed Lindsay Clancy, they mean something vague — a gesture toward bureaucracy, toward gaps in care, toward the general inadequacy of mental health services in America. But the system that failed her is not vague. It has a specific architecture: a pharmaceutical industry that shapes the evidence base for psychiatric treatment, a profession that has reorganized itself around the prescription pad, and a standard of care that defines medication management as sufficient — with psychotherapy optional, separate, and someone else’s job. That system was not built by accident. It was built by money, and sustained by the absence of something medicine once considered essential: an ongoing relationship between a patient and a clinician who actually knows her.


In 1994, a Louisville jury found that Prozac had not caused Joseph Wesbecker to walk into his former workplace and kill eight people. Wesbecker had been prescribed Prozac two years after the drug’s FDA approval; he had a long history of psychiatric difficulty, and Eli Lilly’s defense argued that his history, not the drug, explained what he did.

What the jury did not know was that Lilly had suppressed evidence that Prozac worsened suicidality in some patients. German regulators had initially rejected the drug; Lilly won approval there only after reclassifying suicide attempts in its clinical trial data. None of this was shared with the FDA or with American physicians. When the Wesbecker case went to trial, Lilly quietly paid off the families of the victims — the very people suing the company — to drop the most damaging claims against it. This was done in secret, while the trial continued and the jury was allowed to render a verdict exonerating the drug. The cover-up surfaced seven months later during unrelated divorce litigation. The verdict stood.

John Cornwell documented this in his 1996 book The Power to Harm. What he described was not a single act of corporate misconduct. It was a system — one in which a pharmaceutical company shaped the evidence base for its own drug, managed the legal consequences when that drug contributed to violence, and emerged with its product’s reputation intact. The doctors who prescribed Prozac in the years that followed did so in good faith, on the basis of an evidence base the company had helped construct.

That system did not end in 1996. It matured.


Pharmaceutical companies do not train psychiatrists directly. They do something more effective for increasing their own revenue: they fund the people who do. Drug companies pay faculty physicians to speak at conferences, sponsor the continuing medical education courses that psychiatrists are required to complete to maintain their licenses, and fund the research that becomes the evidence base residents are taught from. Between 2015 and 2021, pharmaceutical companies paid $358 million to American psychiatrists — three quarters of all practicing psychiatrists received at least one payment. The top one percent received a median of nearly $363,000 each.

The result is a standard of care shaped less by clinical outcome research than by the financial interests of the companies whose drugs that standard recommends. A psychiatrist trained in this system learns, not through corruption but through immersion, that the primary tool is the prescription pad. Psychotherapy — when it appears at all — is something another provider does, separately, if the patient can access it and afford it.

This is not a conspiracy. It is an incentive structure. Prescribing is reimbursable and scalable; a psychiatrist can see four or five patients an hour for medication management. Psychotherapy is neither. The economics of the profession have followed the economics of the industry, and the standard of care has followed the economics of the profession. And what has been lost in that reorganization is not merely a treatment modality — it is the relationship itself; the clinician who knows the patient well enough to notice when something is going wrong.

Lindsay Clancy had six prescribers and no psychotherapist. Within the logic of the system, each of those prescribers may have done nothing wrong. That is precisely the problem.


If the system were working, we would expect to see evidence of it in population outcomes. We do not. Since 1999, the U.S. suicide rate rose by more than thirty percent — while the global suicide rate fell thirty-eight percent over roughly the same period. Psychiatric prescriptions more than doubled after 2001; one in six American adults now takes a psychiatric drug. Rates of anxiety, depression, and addiction deaths have moved in the same direction. These figures come not from critics of psychiatry but from Thomas Insel, the former director of the National Institute of Mental Health — the agency that has overseen and funded American psychiatric research for decades. More treatment, more medication, worse outcomes. The system is not failing despite itself. It is functioning as designed.


I want to be clear about what I am and am not arguing. I am a doctor specializing in mind and brain — a clinician and researcher with more than forty years at the intersection of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience. I am not naive about what medication can do, and I am not arguing against it. I have seen medication change lives. I have seen it lift people out of depressions so severe they could not function, stabilize people in crisis, make the work of psychotherapy possible when it otherwise would not have been.

What I am arguing is that medication without ongoing psychotherapy is almost always irresponsible — not because the drugs don’t work, but because no one is watching. A psychotherapist who meets with a patient weekly knows when something is shifting. She notices when the patient seems more agitated than last week, when the reported side effects are escalating, when the husband’s concern is a signal rather than noise. She is in a position to say: something is wrong here, we need to stop, we need to change course.

Six prescribers cannot do that. No one of them has the full picture. Each sees a slice — a symptom, a complaint, a dose to adjust — and responds within that slice. The result, in Lindsay Clancy’s case, was eleven medications in four months, each one rational in isolation, the combination catastrophic.

The standard of care says this is acceptable. The standard of care is wrong.


Patrick Clancy’s lawsuit asks whether individual psychiatrists committed malpractice. That question deserves an answer. But the larger question — why a seriously ill woman in 2023 could be seen by six providers, prescribed eleven medications, and have no one in her life whose professional role was simply to know her and pay attention — that question will not be answered in a courtroom.

It will be answered, if it is answered at all, when psychiatry is willing to reckon honestly with what it has become: a prescribing profession, shaped by an industry that profits from prescriptions, operating under a standard of care that has made the most important element of treatment — the sustained, attentive therapeutic relationship — someone else’s problem.

Lindsay Clancy’s children are dead. She will spend the rest of her life with that. The system that failed her is still operating, today, with thousands of other patients. That is what “the system” means. And that is who built it.